How metaphysical commitments shape the study of psychological mechanisms by Hochstein, Eric
1 
 
How Metaphysical Commitments Shape the Study of Psychological Mechanisms 
Eric Hochstein 
Forthcoming in: Theory & Psychology 
 
 
Abstract: The study of psychological and cognitive mechanisms is an interdisciplinary endeavor, 
requiring insights from many different domains (from electrophysiology, to psychology, to 
theoretical neuroscience, to computer science). In this paper, I argue that philosophy plays an 
essential role in this interdisciplinary project, and that effective scientific study of psychological 
mechanisms requires that working scientists be responsible metaphysicians. This means 
adopting deliberate metaphysical positions when studying mechanisms that go beyond what is 
empirically justified regarding the nature of the phenomenon being studied, the conditions of its 
occurrence, and its boundaries. Such metaphysical commitments are necessary in order to set 
up experimental protocols, determine which variables to manipulate under experimental 
conditions, and which conclusions to draw from different scientific models and theories. It is 
important for scientists to be aware of the metaphysical commitments they adopt, since they 
can easily be led astray if invoked carelessly. On the other hand, if we are cautious in the 
application of our metaphysical commitments, and careful with the inferences we draw from 
them, then they can provide new insights into how we might find connections between models 
and theories of mechanisms that appear incompatible. 
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The pioneering neuroscientist Santiago Ramón y Cajal famously claimed that “to know the brain […] is 
equivalent to ascertaining the material course of thought and will, to discovering the intimate history of 
life in its perpetual duel with external forces” (1937). In other words, with the age of substance dualism 
behind us, the quest for understanding the human mind has become a quest for understanding the 
human brain. Moreover, since we know the brain to be a massively complex system composed of 
neurochemical mechanisms, the quest for understanding the human mind has ultimately become a 
quest for understanding the physical mechanisms that compose it. 
 This should not be surprising, as it brings the human mind in-line with other known biological 
phenomena. The history of biology has largely been a story about the search for mechanisms. Our 
understanding of a biological phenomenon typically involves understanding the mechanisms that 
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produce and sustain it. Understanding how DNA replicates, for instance, involves understanding how 
“the DNA double helix unwinds, exposing slightly charged bases to which complementary bases bond, 
producing, after several more stages, two duplicate helices” (Machamer, Darden & Craver, 2000, p. 3). 
Understanding how and why the poison Curare kills involves understanding how it mimics the structure 
of acetycholine, a neurotransmitter, and binds to certain receptors at the neuromuscular junction. This 
blocks the muscle from receiving electrical signals from adjacent motor neurons. As a result, muscles like 
the diaphragm cannot receive electrical stimulation and therefore become paralyzed, making it 
impossible for the animal to breathe (Craver & Darden, 2013, p. 1-14). In a similar fashion, 
understanding psychological phenomena like memory or attention requires understanding how the 
mechanisms of the brain are structured, and how they operate to generate such phenomena. 
While the discovery and understanding of these psychological mechanisms has largely been 
thought to be a strictly empirical process, in this paper I will argue that there is an important and often 
overlooked philosophical component to the study of mechanisms in psychology and cognitive science. 
More specifically, I will demonstrate that scientists must adopt explicit metaphysical commitments 
when studying psychological mechanisms. These metaphysical commitments must go beyond what is 
empirically justified, but are nevertheless necessary in order to set up experimental protocols, 
determine which variables to manipulate in experimental contexts, and which conclusions to draw from 
our scientific models and theories. These commitments are interwoven with our experimental practices, 
and often implicitly guide our scientific methodologies. Moreover, appropriate study of psychological 
mechanisms requires that scientists be constantly vigilant of what their metaphysical commitments are, 
how they guide their research, when they require additional justification, and when they must be 
abandoned in favour of others. In this respect, being a good scientist requires being a responsible 
metaphysician, and engaging in appropriate philosophical theorizing. 
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 In order to make this argument, I begin in section 1 by providing an account of what 
psychological mechanisms are, and the ways in which we study and discover them. In section 2, I 
highlight the ways in which metaphysical commitments and reasoning play an essential role in the 
successful study and discovery of mechanisms. In section 3, I identify particular instances in 
contemporary psychology and cognitive science where scientists who failed to identify or engage with 
the appropriate philosophical and metaphysical reasoning created problems for their experimental 
designs, and in their analysis of experimental results. Finally, in section 4, I argue that one of the most 
pressing problems in contemporary cognitive science, the lack of unification or integration among 
theories and models in the study of psychological mechanisms, can be overcome by paying closer 
attention to the metaphysical commitments that different models and theories implicitly adopt in their 
construction and application. By highlighting these commitments, we can find points of contact between 
seemingly contradictory models by identifying implicitly shared metaphysical commitments that they 
adopt.  This allows each model to inform each other, and to contribute to the same over-arching 
integrative explanation of a mechanism, despite the models themselves making incompatible claims. 
 
Section 1: The Study of Mechanisms 
 
1.1 What Are Mechanisms? 
 
It is best to begin by saying a bit more about what mechanisms are. Talk of “mechanisms” is ubiquitous 
throughout the sciences. For example, in political science we might talk of the mechanism responsible 
for social change. Similarly, an economist might talk of the mechanism responsible for the rise in 
monetary inflation. However, there is a more specific sense of mechanism that is commonly employed 
within the context of psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science. Put simply: 
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While mechanisms are defined variously, the core idea is that they are organized systems, 
comprising causally relevant component parts and operations (or activities) thereof. Parts of the 
mechanism interact and their orchestrated operation contributes to the capacity of the 
mechanism. (Miłkowski, 2013, p. 3050) 
 
Suppose, for instance, that we wish to understand the mechanism by which one neuron transmits an 
electrical signal to another. In this case, the mechanism involves a neuron (the presynaptic neuron) 
releasing a neurotransmitter which crosses the synaptic cleft between it and the adjacent neuron (the 
postsynaptic neuron). The chemical then binds to particular receptors on the postsynaptic neuron, 
which opens pores in the cell wall allowing electrical current (positively or negatively charged ions) to 
pass from the first neuron into the second. 
Note that understanding the mechanism in this case involves decomposing the system into parts 
and operations. More specifically, it involves identifying particular structures (the presynaptic neuron, 
the postsynaptic neuron, the neurotransmitter, the receptors, the positively or negatively charged ions) 
whose interactions produce the phenomenon. These structures must be organized in very particular 
ways for the phenomenon to occur (i.e. the neurons need to be organized so that the 
neurotransmitters, when released, are positioned to cross the synaptic cleft and bind to the receptors). 
This organization allows the parts of the system to causally interact with one another in very particular 
ways (i.e. the neurotransmitters bind to receptors, opening the pores, allowing the ions to enter the 
neuron). This in turn produces the phenomenon of interest. Understanding a mechanism therefore 
requires identifying and understanding the parts that make it up, their organization, the operations that 
go on between the parts, and the resulting phenomenon. 
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 With this understanding of mechanisms in hand, let us now consider how we can discover and 
learn about such mechanisms. What follows is a brief account of what is involved in learning about the 
mechanisms responsible for psychological phenomena. A more complete account of this process would 
need to be far more in-depth than can be reasonably provided in a paper of this length, and so for a 
more detailed exploration of this process, I would point readers to: Craver, 2007; Bechtel, 2008; and 
Craver & Darden, 2013. For the purposes of this paper, I wish only to highlight and identify some of the 
essential features and complications of the discovery process, and provide some historical examples to 
illustrate. 
 
1.2 Learning about Mechanisms 
 
In order to understand the mechanism responsible for a particular psychological phenomenon, we must 
begin with an understanding of what that phenomenon is. For example, if we wish to understand the 
mechanisms responsible for episodic memory, then we must begin with a characterization of what 
episodic memory is supposed to be, when it appears, and under what conditions. Knowing when the 
phenomenon occurs, or fails to occur, is often the first step in discovering the underlying mechanism 
that produces it. As William Bechtel rightly points out: 
 
To begin with, if scientists are theorizing about a mechanism to explain a particular kind of 
behavior, it is indispensable to begin with a good characterization of the behavior. Otherwise, 
they may produce a proposal for a possible mechanism that does not in fact exist, and whose 
behavior would not correspond to anything that actually happens. Moreover, once a mechanism 
is proposed, the evidence for or against it comes not just from investigations of internal 
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operations but from whether it actually can account for factors that are known to affect the 
behavior. (2005, p. 323) 
 
This means we often study mechanisms by reverse engineering them. By characterizing in detail the 
phenomenon, and then using this as a guide for determining what mechanisms are operating when the 
phenomenon is in effect, or absent when it is not. The more detailed our account of the phenomenon, 
the more constraints it places on what sorts of mechanisms are capable of producing that phenomenon 
under those known conditions. 
Consider the study of the action potential in the mid-20th century. The now famous Hodgkin & 
Huxley model of the squid giant axon (1952) was originally created with the intention of identifying and 
describing the mechanism by which the action potential of the neuron fired. The model ultimately failed 
to accomplish this goal, but it was able to mathematically characterize the time course of the action 
potential by identifying relevant time and voltage dependencies. With this mathematical 
characterization of the phenomenon in hand, scientists were then able to use these dependencies as a 
guide for future research by treating them as constraints that any potential mechanistic account of the 
phenomenon needed to conform to. In the 1960s and 70s, “textbook descriptions of the mechanisms 
underlying the action potential were heavily based on the Hodgkin and Huxley papers. Membranes were 
typically introduced with an equivalent circuit diagram and were then followed by the Hodgkin-Huxley 
sodium conductance curves” (Trumpler, 1997, p. 63).  
As another example, consider the study of the Thompson Effect. The Thompson Effect is a 
psychological phenomenon whereby we discriminate the speed of an object based not on its actual 
movement but on the visual contrast between it and its surrounding environment. The greater the visual 
contrast, the faster the object appears to be moving. Alan Stocker and Eero Simoncelli were able to 
construct a mathematical model which could accurately predict how fast an object would appear to be 
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moving to an observer given its level of visual contrast (Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006). This model did not 
identify any of the mechanisms responsible for the Thompson Effect, but by describing and predicting 
the phenomenon in a detailed way, it pointed the way towards what mechanisms were likely involved. 
They claim that: 
 
 The form of the contrast-dependent measurement noise in our model suggests that the locus of 
 representation for measurements m is likely to be cortical. Neurons in area MT are a natural 
 choice: they are highly motion selective, and their responses have been directly linked to 
 perception. (Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006, p. 583) 
 
 Of course, using a detailed account of the phenomenon as a guide for identifying the relevant 
underlying mechanisms is not nearly as straightforward a task as it may initially appear. Discovering and 
characterizing the parts, organization, or operations of a complex mechanism, even when we have a 
detailed account of the phenomenon, often requires the resources, methodologies, and experimental 
practices of many different scientific domains. Each domain provides limited information about the 
system that can inform, constrain, and guide the research of the others. 
To illustrate, let us return to the study of the action potential. The Hodgkin & Huxley model 
characterized the time course of the action potential, but did not provide any account of the parts or 
operations of the mechanism within the neuron that produced them. Ultimately, an account of what 
these structural and organizational features of the neuron were had to be inferred from the results of 
many different studies conducted by scientists working in different domains. These studies, in 
conjunction with the behavioural data of the Hodgkin & Huxley model, allowed scientists to triangulate 
on what the mechanism of the action potential was likely to be. For instance, in the early 1970s, the 
biologists Singer and Nicholson proposed that a part in the mechanism of the action potential was a 
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protein pore embedded in the membrane of the cell that allowed for changes in its conductance (1972). 
Part of their reasoning for this was due to results being generated by different scientists working in 
electrophysiology. As Maria Trumpler argues: 
 
Electrophysiologists had shown that several neurotoxins, most notably Tetrodotoxin (TTX), not 
only blocked the sodium conductance but produced a binding curve of the same form as that 
established for other proteins. Thus it was plausible that the sodium conductance might be a 
protein pore embedded in the membrane, with at least one part permanently accessible to the 
external solution (1997, p.71) 
 
 Put simply, certain behavioural changes we see in neurons when they are exposed to 
tetrodotoxin are consistent with behavioural changes we see in those neurons when they bind to 
various proteins, but in this case it likewise stops electric current from entering the neuron. This 
suggests that the conductance of the neuron may be due to a protein pore, which was being blocked by 
the tetrodotoxin. Here, the results of experiments generated by electrophysiologists, in addition to the 
conductance curves identified by the Hodgkin & Huxley model, were both needed to help biologists 
point the way towards identifying and understanding one of the crucial components of the mechanism 
for the action potential (protein pores). This nicely highlights how learning about the parts, operations, 
organization, and phenomenon of a mechanism requires the resources of different domains of science, 
each of which provide guidance and constraints on the others. Other examples include the discovery of 
the mechanisms responsible for learning (Craver 2007, p.243), long term potentiation (Miłkowski 
2016a), and protein synthesis (Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000), which all required insights from 
multiple distinct scientific domains and methodologies. 
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 With this established, I now intend to argue that philosophy is another domain which 
contributes to the study of psychological mechanisms in important ways. More specifically, that this 
process of discovery and understanding only works when scientists take on board numerous 
metaphysical commitments about the world that often go beyond what is empirically warranted, but 
which are nonetheless necessary in order for the experimental study of mechanistic systems to take 
place. 
 
Section 2: Mechanisms, Methodology & Metaphysics 
 
As we’ve seen, the study of a complex mechanism often begins with a detailed characterization of the 
phenomenon produced by that mechanism, which then points the way to possible underlying structures 
and causes. However, in order for us to effectively study the phenomenon itself, scientists must begin by 
taking on metaphysical commitments regarding what the phenomenon is and what its boundaries are. 
These commitments are not initially determined by empirical study, since they must be presupposed in 
order to set up our experimental conditions needed for relevant empirical study. Such commitments 
often require appropriate justification and argumentation, since different commitments would licence 
or justify incompatible sets of experimental protocols and procedures. Moreover, keeping track of these 
commitments throughout our empirical investigations, and recognizing when to revise or adopt 
different commitments as new data emerges, is key to our study and discovery of psychological 
mechanisms. In other words, scientists must learn to be good metaphysicians in order for the study of 
psychological mechanisms to be successful. 
 To illustrate, suppose we wish to identify and understand the psychological mechanisms 
responsible for emotions like anger, sadness, or joy. This requires starting with the assumption that 
there is indeed a coherent and well-delineated metaphysical phenomenon that corresponds to anger, 
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sadness, or joy. We must be committed to metaphysical facts about what the phenomenon is supposed 
to be, that it is there in the world to be studied, and that there are clear instances of its manifestation. 
We cannot look for the mechanisms for anger without starting with assumptions regarding the existence 
and occurrence of anger. The psychologist Lisa Feldman Barrett highlights this fact when she notes that 
there is... 
 
...wide acceptance [among psychologists and neuroscientists] of assumptions that are not 
warranted by the available empirical evidence. These assumptions can be summarized by one 
core idea: Certain emotions (at least those referred to in Western cultures by the words 
“anger,” “sadness,” “fear,” “disgust,” and “happiness”) are given to us by nature. That is, they 
are natural kinds, or phenomena that exist independent of our perception of them. Each 
emotion is thought to produce coordinated changes in sensory, perceptual, motor, and 
physiological functions that, when measured, provide evidence of that emotion’s existence. The 
natural-kind view of emotion has been productive in defining the boundaries for the scientific 
study of emotion and continues to guide scientific discourse: It underlies the major questions, 
the experimental designs, and the interpretation of empirical findings that characterize emotion 
research as a domain of scientific inquiry. (2006, p. 28-29) 
 
For the moment, let us leave aside the question of whether this is the correct metaphysical story to tell 
about what basic emotions are (namely, “a nonarbitrary grouping of instances that occur in the world 
[…] given by nature and is discovered, not created, by the human mind” Barrett, 2006, p. 29). What is 
more important to note for now is that in order to study emotion, we must take on board some 
metaphysical commitments about what emotions are, and what their boundaries are. It is these 
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commitments that allow us to define the conditions for the scientific study of emotion, underlies the 
experimental designs we use, and the ways in which we interpret our empirical findings.  
 To illustrate, suppose we wish to study the mechanism responsible for anger. If we assume that 
anger is a distinct psychological phenomenon, then we might try to use various neuroimaging 
techniques to see which brain regions become active when a given subject is angry, and whether that 
subject remains angry when those regions are not active (this might include using things like PET or fMRI 
scans to observe blood flow to various parts of the brain). This may allow us to localize the parts and 
organizations that constitute the mechanism for anger. On the other hand, suppose we assume that 
anger is not a single unified phenomenon, and is instead an ill-defined category that is arbitrarily 
lumping together numerous different and completely unrelated psychological phenomena. We would 
now not conduct the same experiment as before. The fact that certain brain regions are active when we 
would describe someone as being “angry” tells us nothing about what mechanisms are in fact at work, 
or what those brain regions do. And so depending on the metaphysical commitments we take on board 
regarding what the nature of the phenomenon is, and when it occurs, this will lead to radically different 
accounts of what the underlying mechanisms of the system are thought to be, and how we ought to 
study them. Yet, we cannot proceed without some metaphysical story in-hand; otherwise we have no 
means of setting up experimental protocols at all, or determining which variables to intervene on. In this 
respect, scientists must go beyond what is empirically licensed by the available evidence from the outset 
and make deliberate metaphysical claims and arguments about the phenomenon in the world in order 
to scientifically investigate it. 
 To build on this point further, consider the sorts of neuroimaging techniques mentioned above 
(like PET and fMRI scans). Attempts to localize and identify which neurological mechanisms are 
responsible for which kinds of psychological phenomena using such techniques frequently involve the 
use of subtractive neuroimaging studies. These studies require taking two sets of scans of a subject. The 
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first set of scans are taken when the subject is passive; not engaging in any sort psychological task. This 
provides a baseline for comparison. We then take a further set of scans when the subject is engaging in 
the relevant psychological activity (or undergoing the relevant experience) we wish to explain. We then 
subtract the findings of the first set from the second and observe any differences. Any brain regions that 
appear to be active when the psychological phenomenon is present, but not when the subject is at rest, 
is thereby thought to contain the relevant mechanism responsible for the phenomenon. 
 Yet in order for these sorts of studies to provide the relevant empirical data regarding the 
location of the target mechanism, working scientists are first required to adopt explicit metaphysical 
commitments regarding structural and functional features of the brain that have not yet been 
empirically determined. Specifically, that the brain is primarily composed of feed-forward modules, and 
that the neural activity identified in the subtraction studies can point to the relevant localizable module 
responsible for the phenomenon. Without these metaphysical assumptions, we cannot infer from 
increased activity in a particular brain region that the mechanism responsible for the psychological 
phenomenon is to be found there. As Van Orden & Paap note: 
 
Briefly, one must begin with [the assumption that they have the] “true” theory of cognition’s 
components, and assume that corresponding functional and anatomical modules exist in the 
brain. The true theory is necessary to ensure that experimental and control images differ by the 
single component of interest. Additionally, the brain must be composed of feed-forward 
modules to ensure that the component of interest makes no qualitative changes “upstream” on 
the shared components of experimental and control tasks. Finally, each contrasted task must 
invoke the minimum set of components for successful task performance. If any one of these 
assumptions is false the enterprise fails.  
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Assuming we knew the actual components of cognition, and the modularity assumption were 
true, then neuroimaging studies could reliably localize cognitive components in brain regions. 
One cannot disconfirm false models, however, because subtractions always highlight some brain 
region. Nevertheless, if different laboratories draw experimental and control tasks from 
different models (only one of which could be “true”), or if the modularity assumption is false, 
then images may diverge rather than converge. (1997, p. S87-S88) 
 
Van Orden & Paap go on to argue that many of these metaphysical commitments are in fact false, and 
thus call into question the scientific value of certain neuroimaging studies (see also: Uttal 2001). For our 
immediate purposes, however, we need not be concerned with whether such metaphysical 
commitments are true or not. Instead, it is important only to highlight the fact that our empirical 
investigation of the mechanisms underlying psychological phenomena using subtractive neuroimaging 
studies first requires that working scientist adopt metaphysical commitments about the system 
producing it. Without some metaphysical commitment one way or another, we are unable to draw 
relevant conclusions about psychological mechanisms from such studies. Different sets of metaphysical 
commitments results in wildly divergent interpretations of the data produced by the techniques. In this 
regard, the very act of engaging in this sort of empirical investigation is heavily dependent on the 
metaphysical commitments that scientists adopt, and the justifications they provide in favour of them. 
 Even the assumption that we can identify the well-delineated parts and operations of the 
mechanisms responsible for psychological phenomena contains an empirically-contentious metaphysical 
assumption that the mechanisms which exist in nature always have clearly definable parts, operations, 
and boundaries. Yet often our empirical studies do not yield a clean or straightforward decomposition of 
a psychological phenomenon into well-delineated parts and boundaries (Bechtel 2015; Austin 2017; 
Chirimuuta 2017). Mutual manipulation experiments, which are designed to empirically demarcate parts 
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of mechanisms from their environment1, frequently include too much or too little. As Christopher Austin 
notes,  
 
Though [mutual manipulability seems] prima facie plausible, a bi-directional boundary building 
test based on counterfactual discrimination may be problematic in the biological realm. For 
instance, in one direction of dependency, it may be too restrictive, and generate false negatives: 
the holistic, mechanism-level activity of complex biological systems is often impervious to minor 
alterations in the activities of their constituents – a phenomenon known as robustness. In the 
other direction, it may be too permissive, and generate false positives: a large swathe of 
organismal features (both morphological and behavioural) bear counterfactual dependence 
relations to extra-organismal, environmental stimuli, as evidenced by the well-known 
phenomenon of phenotypic plasticity. (Austin 2017, p.417)  
 
A clearly defined boundary between mechanisms and their environments frequently requires a choice 
on the part of working scientists to metaphysically demarcate where the mechanism officially begins 
and ends, and this often cannot be straightforwardly determined through strictly empirical means. This 
is why Bechtel insists that... 
 
 It is the cognitive activities of investigators that picked out some entities as the parts 
 constituting the [target mechanism] and screened off or ignored the effects of other entities on 
 these parts. [...] In particular, the scientists have deemed specific entities as particularly 
                                                             
1 These experiments attempt to determine whether a given structure can be manipulated independently of the 
occurrence of the phenomenon. If a manipulation of the structure has no effect on the occurrence of the 
phenomenon, then it is likely not a part of the mechanism producing it. But if we cannot manipulate the 
phenomenon without likewise manipulating the structure, then it is likely a part of the mechanism itself. 
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 relevant to explaining the phenomenon they were interested in and have included them in the 
 mechanism. This involves creating boundaries in an interconnected world. (2015, p. 88) 
 
This is likewise why Austin suggests that “the compositional stability that individuates mechanisms is 
merely a heuristic necessity applicable only to models of mechanisms: the biological realm is not 
mereologically dissected into frozen collections of unalterable clockwork, even if our models of that 
realm must be.” (Austin 2017).   
 This is not to suggest that psychological phenomena do not have mechanistic explanations, only 
that there is often not a clear or straightforward way of empirically demarcating the boundaries of 
where such mechanisms begin and end. However, despite this, there can often be good metaphysical 
reasons to clearly demarcate mechanisms at one point instead of another, even if there are not decisive 
empirical ones. As Bechtel argues, 
 
 For different explanatory purposes researchers may draw these boundaries in different 
 locations or at different time points. These choices, though, while not simply responsible to pre-
 existing boundaries, are not entirely arbitrary. [...] [W]hile real-world networks are highly 
 interconnected, there are clusters within them that are semi-independent of the rest and 
 productively posited to be the mechanisms responsible for specific phenomena. (2015, p. 85) 
 
More importantly, scientifically studying the neurological and physiological structures and organizations 
that produce and sustain psychological phenomena frequently requires that scientists work with clearly 
defined boundaries to systems in order to set up experimental protocols. Thus, a metaphysical 
commitment to a clearly defined boundary becomes an essential part of investigating mechanisms. 
Mazvitta Chirimuuta (2017), for instance, claims that “the positing of boundaries is a useful way to 
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simplify the explanandum. It enables neuroscientists to bracket some of the known facts about the 
brain’s messy, Heraclitean nature.” (p.1150). Bechtel likewise insists that imposing boundaries “serves 
an important role in the project of developing mechanistic explanations” (2015, p. 92). Meanwhile, Chris 
Eliasmith (2009) notes that without deciding on a system’s boundaries, it becomes impossible to 
effectively investigate it under experimental conditions. 
 In all of these examples, engaging in appropriate scientific methodology first requires engaging 
in metaphysical theory and argumentation, and that the results of these endeavors radically shape the 
experimental practices that result. All of this is not to suggest that the initial metaphysical commitments 
that scientists choose to adopt are somehow immune from future revisions, only that we must engage 
in metaphysical deliberation and reasoning in order to conduct the required empirical investigations. Of 
course, our metaphysical commitments might eventually need to be revised after a great deal of 
empirical work has taken place. We might find that the theories and models which use certain 
metaphysical commitments as their foundation eventually run into dead ends, or provide results or 
conclusions that are impossible or incoherent. This can require changing our metaphysical 
understanding of what the phenomenon is. In this regard, the study of psychological mechanisms 
requires being responsible metaphysicians: keeping track of which metaphysical commitments are 
required to empirically investigate the phenomenon, and which of our commitments may need further 
justification or revision.  
 Should we be concerned by the fact that scientists must be good metaphysicians in order to do 
their empirical research? Not at all. The very shift during the cognitive revolution from behaviourism to 
representational theories of mental phenomena demonstrates how a shift in metaphysical 
commitments have altered the way in which scientists can and do study psychological mechanisms. The 
study of mechanisms is a deeply interdisciplinary endeavour. The conceptual resources and 
methodological practices of many different disciplines play an important part in the discovery, study, 
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and understanding of psychological or cognitive mechanisms. Philosophy is simply one of these 
disciplines. Like with every discipline, however, it must be carried out responsibly. Being careless with 
one’s metaphysical commitments can easily lead one astray. Scientists need to be cautious about the 
sorts of metaphysical commitments they adopt, and careful about the inferences they draw from those 
commitments. The importance of metaphysics in studying psychological mechanisms can be made even 
more apparent when we examine cases in which problems have emerged in psychology and cognitive 
science precisely because a lack of care was taken by psychologists in tending to their metaphysical 
commitments, or failing to sufficiently justify them. 
 
Section 3: When Lack of Metaphysical Care Breeds Adversity 
 
To better illustrate just how the metaphysical commitments of working scientists influence the scientific 
study of psychological mechanisms, let us consider the ways in which inattention to such commitments 
have led to complications in the study of such mechanisms.  
 
3.1 Double Dissociation and Mechanism Localization 
 
One of the most common methods by which cognitive scientists try to map psychological phenomena 
onto neurological mechanisms is by way of double dissociation studies. If damage to one brain region 
seems to affect a subject’s ability to carry out one sort of psychological task, but not another, and 
damage to a different region affects their ability to carry out the second task, but not the first, then we 
have reason to think those tasks are produced by distinct mechanisms localized in different brain 
regions. The localization of one mechanism can be inferred from the subject’s deficit in the given task 
when there is damage to one brain region, but not to the other. Meanwhile, the positing of a different 
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mechanism for the second phenomenon can be inferred from its continued function after lesioning of 
the first region, but not after lesioning of the second. These sorts of cases are the primary method 
employed in Cognitive Neuropsychology, a field dedicated to bridging our understanding of 
psychological phenomena with our mechanistic understanding of the brain (Patterson & Plaut 2009). 
 While this may seem intuitive, the problem with this method of inferring distinct localized 
psychological mechanisms from instances of psychological disfunction is that we must adopt certain 
contentious metaphysical commitments about the brain for the inference to hold. One such 
commitment is that the brain is massively modular, since this is required in order to justify the inference 
from the subject’s deficit in a given task to the idea that the mechanism uniquely responsible for that 
task resides in the damaged brain region. A second is that we can use such cases of double dissociation 
to reliably say something about the functional organization of human brains in general. Yet there is 
strong evidence that we should be highly suspicious of both these metaphysical assumptions (see: 
Goldberg 1995; Van Orden & Paap 1997; Samuels 1998; Cowie & Woodward 2004; Poldrack 2006; 
Hohwy 2007; Patterson & Plaut 2009; Anderson 2007, 2008, 2010; Eliasmith 2013; Palecek 2017).  
 For our purposes, the fact worth noting here is not so much that the metaphysical commitments 
adopted by cognitive neuropsychologists may be contentious, but that many cognitive 
neuropsychologists were not aware that they were presupposing these commitments, or did not believe 
they needed any justification. As Patterson & Plaut (2009) point out, “the assumption that cognitive 
abilities have the identical functional organization in all brains […] was not always made explicit and⁄or 
defended”, and that when it came to criticisms of this assumption, “perhaps the surprise is how 
relatively infrequent such criticism was.” (p.42) They similarly note that published concerns about the 
empirical plausibility of massive modularity “were infrequent and had little impact on the cognitive 
neuropsychology mainstream” (p.44). The lack of appropriate attention paid to these implicit 
metaphysical commitments have resulted in many cognitive neuropsychologists failing to notice that 
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various key inferences being drawn from double dissociation studies were extremely misleading or not 
consistent with other empirical findings. 
The intuitive inference that takes one from a double dissociation to the conclusion of localized 
mechanisms is extremely seductive to many psychologists and cognitive neuropsychologists precisely 
because they have unexamined metaphysical commitments that shape how they evaluate such cases. 
For instance, if damage to a particular brain region does not yield a clear deficit in a given psychological 
function, the immediate conclusion that the mechanism which carries out this function must be located 
elsewhere is only intuitive if one implicitly assumes that the mechanisms of the brain are modular and 
not deeply integrated and interconnected. If the later is the case, as an increasing number of cognitive 
scientists argue (e.g. Anderson 2007, 2008, 2010; Patterson & Plaut 2009; Eliasmith 2013; Palecek 2017), 
then it may well be the case that damage to the brain region does damage the mechanism responsible 
for the target function or ability, but that other brain regions compensated for the damage allowing the 
ability to be carried out in a different way (see: Seidenberg 1988). In other words, “when a complex and 
adaptive system like the brain is damaged, it may still manage to perform a task but in a fashion not all 
that informative about normal function” (Patterson & Plaut 2009, p. 44). Meanwhile, the loss of function 
when a different brain region is damaged likewise does not necessarily licence the conclusion that the 
mechanism is localized there. Instead, it may reflect the fact that certain essential links in a deeply 
interconnected network may have been severed, cutting off a small part of the mechanism from it’s 
larger distributed whole (as opposed to the mechanism itself being localized in the second area). As 
Michael Anderson points out, “it is possible for focal lesions to cause specific functional deficits in non-
modular systems, and double-dissociations do not by themselves support any inference about the 
underlying functional architecture of the brain” (2010, p.248). And so the inference that is typically 
drawn to the localization of distinct mechanisms is not one that obviously follows from the results of any 
double dissociation case. Yet in virtue of not paying attention to their underlying metaphysical 
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commitments, many psychologists and cognitive neuropsychologists can often be unaware of just how 
much those commitments influence their evaluation of the data and the inferences they make.  
To make matters worse, evidence that is emerging from other domains of cognitive science 
which point to a more integrative picture of brain are being largely overlooked precisely because the 
implicit metaphysical commitment to modularity has led many to ignore other accounts of 
representation and information processing that have been developed. This is precisely why Patterson & 
Plaut caution that… 
 
…cognitive neuropsychology has become increasingly detached from other areas within 
cognitive science and neuroscience in large part because the modularity assumption licenses a 
lack of consideration of representations and processes, and it is exactly in this respect that 
cognitive science can make a critical contribution to cognitive neuropsychology. […] Perhaps it 
would be more fruitful to start with a theoretical framework grounded in interactivity and then 
explore the extent to which it can give rise not only to normal cognitive behavior but also to the 
types of selective deficits observed in neuropsychological research. (Patterson & Plaut 2009, 
p.47) 
  
The point of all this is not to suggest that localization of functions to brain regions based on 
double dissociation studies is always necessarily inappropriate. Only that failing to pay attention to the 
implicit metaphysical commitments underlying their evaluation of such cases has resulted in many 
psychologists being unknowingly drawn to misleading conclusions that may not be licenced by the 
evidence. And so being a responsible metaphysician becomes key here. Knowing what one’s 
metaphysical commitments are is essential since they may need further justification than we have 
provided to licence the inferences being drawn, or they may need revising if new evidence demands it. 
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As Goldberg (1995) argues: “This is not to say that all instances of isolated strong dissociations are 
theoretically useless. This is to say, however, that they must be approached with a degree of wariness, 
pending the demonstration of their high prevalence in the presence of a particular lesion location, 
or⁄and converging evidence from other sources’’ (p. 195). Here we can see exactly how a lack of care in 
tending to one’s metaphysical commitments have led to problems in one of the most common methods 
in learning about psychological mechanisms. 
 
3.2 Dedicated Mechanisms for Core Emotions 
 
For a very different example, let us consider again the study of emotion. Some of the most compelling 
evidence for the idea that certain core emotions like happiness, fear, anger, and sadness are natural 
kinds (i.e. that each corresponds to a distinct innate physiological mechanism that all humans share), is 
that certain emotions are recognized across cultures and are universally associated with certain kinds of 
facial or behavioural expressions (e.g. Ekman et al. 1969, Ekman & Friesen 1971; Izard 1971; Ekman et al. 
1987; Ekman 1992; Russell 1994; Elfenbein & Ambady 2002). This universality in facial and behavioural 
expressions, and our cross-cultural agreement in grouping such expressions together under core 
emotion categories, suggests that we share the same set of basic emotion mechanisms which produce 
those same facial and behavioural expressions in us all (which is why we seem to be able to easily group 
them accordingly across cultures). 
Some of the most influential experiments intended to show this demonstrate that pairing 
different sorts of facial expressions with certain core emotional concepts in different languages results 
in widespread cross-cultural agreement as to which emotions are to be paired with which facial 
expressions (Ekman et al. 1969, Ekman & Friesen 1971; Izard 1971; Ekman et al. 1987; Ekman 1992). 
Other experiments involved telling subjects a short story, and asking them to vocalize in their native 
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language an emotional expression in response to the story being told. Again, substantial agreement was 
found (Sauters et al. 2010, 2015; Cordaro et al. 2016). 
However, one of the central objections to these studies has been that they only appear to 
provide evidence for shared cross-cultural emotion recognition because working scientists 
unintentionally build certain contentious metaphysical commitments that they already believe into the 
experimental protocols of the experiments without realizing it. For instance, Lisa Barrett argues that 
there is not in fact genuine universal agreement that certain facial or behavioural expressions 
correspond to core emotion types, nor evidence that core emotions correspond to distinct types of 
physiological mechanisms (Barrett 2006, 2017). Instead, she argues that it is the emotional concepts and 
their learned usage that dictates how and when certain facial or behavioural expressions tend to be 
categorized together as falling under one emotion type as opposed to another. Without such emotion 
concepts structuring a subject’s categorization of facial or behavioural expressions, subjects do not tend 
to group the relevant facial or behavioural expressions together in the same way.  As a result, it is not at 
all clear that there are shared kinds of facial or behavioural expressions that correspond to core 
emotions across cultures, or that they are universally recognized as such. This undercuts the force of the 
evidence for the natural kind status of core emotions, and the idea that there therefore must be 
dedicated mechanisms for the core emotions that all humans share.  There is no mechanistic 
explanation for core emotions to be found, since they are socially and linguistically constructed and not 
distinct phenomena which are the product of distinct mechanisms. 
But if this is the case, then why do so many studies show universal agreement across different 
linguistic cultures in groupings of facial expressions, or in the emotional evaluation of stories? The 
reason, according to Barrett, is that such studies typically force subjects to classify facial expressions or 
story vignettes based on a specific selection of emotional concepts corresponding to core emotional 
categories. In this respect, subjects are being taught to group expressions in the appropriate way 
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according to the relevant core emotional concepts before the experiments are carried out. When 
subjects did not have the pre-existing emotional concepts, they were taught them for the purposes of 
the experiment.  
For instance, Barrett notes of experiments conducted by Sauters et al. (2010) that: 
 
After the Himba participants heard an emotion story but before they listened to any sound 
pairs, they were asked to describe how the target person in the story was feeling. To help them 
in this task, Sauter and colleagues “allowed participants to listen several times to a given 
recorded story if needed, until they could explain the intended emotion in their own words.” 
Whenever Himba participants described something other than the English emotion concept, 
they received negative feedback and were told to try again. Test subjects who were unable to 
provide the expected description were disqualified from the experiment. In effect, Himba 
participants were not permitted to listen to any sounds, let alone pick the ones that matched 
the story, until they had learned the corresponding English emotion conceptions. (2017, p.50) 
 
Meanwhile, when others tried to carry out the same experiments without first training subjects in the 
use of the leading emotional categories, then the cross-cultural consensus in grouping facial 
expressions, or responding to stories, was lost almost entirely (see: Lindquist et al. 2006; Widen et al. 
2011; Crivelli et al. 2015; Crivelli et al. 2016; Barrett 2017). This suggests that the apparent consensus 
was due to training subjects in the appropriate concepts, and not due to some set of innate emotion 
mechanisms that we all share. Barrett notes that this problem is prevalent in the majority of studies that 
claim to argue for cross-cultural consensus of emotional recognition of core emotions, since they all… 
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…use the basic emotion method, which you have just seen contains a secret stash of concept 
knowledge about emotion. If humans actually had an inborn ability to recognize emotional 
expressions, then removing the emotion words from the method should not matter… but it did, 
every single time. There is very little doubt that emotion words have a powerful influence in 
experiments, instantly casting into doubt the conclusions of every study ever performed that 
used the basic emotion method. (2017, p.52) 
 
Barrett ultimately concludes from this that “emotion concepts are the secret ingredient behind the 
success of the basic emotion method. These concepts make certain facial configurations appear 
universally recognizable as emotional expressions when, in fact, they are not.” (2017, p.51). 
My intention here is not to argue that there is no compelling evidence for the natural kind view 
of emotions (see, for example: McCaffrey, 2016; Celeghin et al., 2017). The point instead is to note that 
by not paying attention to their metaphysical commitments, many psychologists studying emotion may 
have unwittingly built assumptions of natural kinds into their experimental designs when forcing their 
subjects to learn the appropriate core emotion concepts. This in turn produced potentially distorted 
results which seemed to confirm the metaphysical commitments that were already implicitly guiding 
their methodology. On the other hand, if we adopt different metaphysical commitments regarding 
emotions, then the same experimental results (e.g. the apparent cross-cultural agreement of associating 
facial and behavioural expressions with core emotion terms) can be explained by the structuring of the 
emotion concept itself, and not by any universally shared physiological mechanisms underlying core 
emotions. 
 Here then we see again the dangers of not tending to one’s metaphysical commitments. 
Innocent and well-intentioned experimental procedures can result in potentially distortive data if 
scientists are not paying attention to the metaphysical commitments that underlie the construction and 
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application of such procedures. By making these metaphysical commitments explicit, understanding 
how they structure our methodological practices, and understanding when and how they may need to 
be better justified, revised, or reconsidered, we can avoid being unintentionally pulled down misleading 
inferential avenues without noticing. In other words, we must be cautious about the sorts of 
metaphysical commitments we take on board, and when they ought to be replaced or modified. We 
likewise need to be careful about the sorts of inferences we draw from the different metaphysical 
commitments we adopt. These can radically reshape how we study psychological mechanisms, the way 
in which such mechanisms are defined, and the methods we use to study them.  
Of course, just as carelessness with our metaphysical commitments can lead us astray, so too 
can learning to be responsible metaphysicians provide new insights into contemporary scientific 
debates. In the section to follow, I will discuss how learning to be good metaphysicians can help us to 
overcome certain problems regarding the lack of unity or integration currently plaguing the scientific 
study of psychological mechanisms. 
 
Section 4: Metaphysical Commitments and Unification 
 
Given that the study of mechanisms is a deeply interdisciplinary process, one of the biggest obstacles 
currently facing the scientific study of psychological mechanisms is how the information from these 
different domains, which each invoke distinct concepts, theories, and models, can be effectively 
integrated to create a coherent account or explanation of the mechanism. Poldrack et al., for instance, 
claim that cognitive science “faces an increasingly critical challenge: How can we integrate knowledge 
from an exploding number of studies across multiple methodologies in order to characterize how 
mental processes are implemented in the brain?” (2011, p.1) Jacqueline Sullivan likewise claims that 
“over the past two decades scientists and philosophers have noted that rampant conceptual and 
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methodological pluralisms in psychology and neuroscience are impediments to conceptual and 
explanatory progress” (2017, p. 132). 
 Part of what complicates this problem is that different domains of science, given their limited 
scope and resources, often must simplify and idealize aspects of the phenomenon that fall outside their 
particular jurisdiction or focus. Neurobiologists studying the mechanisms responsible for psychological 
phenomena like sexual orientation often do not have the resources or time to include the information 
provided by behavioural genetics, despite such information providing essential insights into various 
components of the mechanism. Instead, the models from neurobiology often abstract away from, 
simplify, or idealize genetic details out of practical necessity, just as models in behavioural genetics will 
similarly idealize or simplify neurobiological details (for details, see: Longino 2006, 2013). This means 
that: 
 
Each approach employs methodologies that require particular ways of understanding the causal 
space. Some phenomena regarded as causally active in one approach are simply not included in 
another. These differential selections result in incongruous causal spaces. (Longino, 2006, p. 
118) 
 
This makes attempts to integrate the various models exceedingly difficult. The various models from 
different scientific domains will not fit together neatly since they each idealize, distort, or simplify 
different features of the target mechanism in incompatible or contradictory ways (see: Mitchel 2002; 
Hochstein 2016a, 2016b).   
All of this means that finding a way to directly integrate the different models, methodologies, 
and theories from different domains into one single gigantic unified model or theory is likely not a 
realistic option. The conflicting simplifying assumptions made by the various models and theories would 
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result in a Frankenstein’s monster of a model full of contradictory claims. And so how do we generate a 
coherent understanding of a complex mechanism, one which incorporates the insights of all these 
different incompatible methods and models? 
 It is here that being responsible metaphysicians can help us. Understanding how seemingly 
incompatible models from different scientific domains or research traditions can inform, constrain, and 
influence one another requires paying close attention to what metaphysical commitments are implicitly 
built into those models, or used as background conditions in their application. The various simplified 
models we created have particular metaphysical assumptions as their foundation. Knowing what those 
assumptions are is key to being able to find points of contact between the different models so as to 
understand how we can draw inferences from one to another. 
Take, as an example, the Spaun model developed by Eliasmith et al. (2012). Spaun is a large-
scale brain model which includes approximately 2.5 million simulated neurons. Typically, large scale 
brain models focus on characterizing organizational features of neural populations and their causal 
interactions, but do not identify how such neural activity connects to complex psychological behaviours. 
Spaun bridges this gap by demonstrating how neural mechanisms can coordinate to carry out, and 
flexibly switch between, a host of different complex psychological tasks. It does this by identifying 
certain principles by which spiking neurons implement neural representations which can then be easily 
manipulated to carry out a range of different computations needed for the different kinds of tasks 
(Eliasmith et al., 2012; Eliasmith, 2013). 
 In order to effectively represent such principles however, the model must work with numerous 
simplifying and idealizing assumptions. First, the model works with point neurons, representing neurons 
as having no morphological or physical characteristics and instead as mere mathematical points with 
appropriate input/output relations. Second, the model treats neural inputs as if they were a linear 
combination of synaptic currents when real neural inputs are not. Third, the model is not nearly as 
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adaptive as a real brain. Fourth, Spaun is unable to learn completely new tasks, which real brains can. 
And fifth, the variability in real spiking neurons are not always reflected in the variability of spiking 
neurons within the model (for more on the idealized nature of Spaun, see: Eliasmith et al., 2012; Stöckel 
et al., 2017). How then do we integrate the principles identified by the Spaun model with other more 
accurate biological models that characterize neuron morphology, electrophysiological models which 
more accurately capture neural input/output relations, and psychological models that characterize the 
complex psychological behaviour that Spaun is attempting to mechanistically explain? 
 This can be done by keeping track of the metaphysical commitments used in the creation and 
application of Spaun, and how they relate to the metaphysical commitments implicit in the application 
and creation of models from different scientific domains. For instance, while Spaun itself includes no 
morphological details of the neurons it represents, the construction of Spaun uses morphological details 
provided by other models as constraints on how their simulated neurons ought to behave. In other 
words, consistency with the behaviour of more accurate biophysical models was built into the behaviour 
of Spaun’s simulated neurons, even though the biophysical details themselves were not included in the 
model. As Eliasmith et al. note, the “model embodies neuroanatomical and neurophysiological 
constraints, making it directly comparable to neural data at many levels of analysis.” (2012). 
 So while Spaun itself idealizes or distorts certain anatomical details identified by other scientific 
models, the construction and application of Spaun is still implicitly metaphysically committed to those 
details.  By understanding what metaphysical commitments the Spaun model implicitly adopts, we can 
determine exactly how other seemingly incompatible models may share points of agreement, and thus 
how to draw inferences across models. To flesh this idea out, consider that while more physiologically 
detailed models make claims about neuron morphology that contradicts the way in which Spaun 
characterizes its point neurons, the creators of Spaun never intended their model to accurately 
represent neuron morphology. In this regard, their metaphysical commitments to the biophysical details 
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not explicitly included in their model allowed them to treat point neurons as idealizations while still 
creating neuron behaviour that is consistent with more biophysically accurate models. In essence, the 
implicit metaphysical commitments upon which Spaun were built align with the metaphysical 
commitments about neuron morphology explicitly stated in more accurate biophysical models, despite 
the fact that Spaun itself idealizes and distorts such details. By keeping track of these metaphysical 
commitments, we can understand how models which make contradictory claims can find points of 
contact by sharing certain metaphysical commitments which allows each to inform, and constrain, the 
other.2 
 What all this means is that integration and unification in cognitive science will not necessarily be 
a matter of amalgamating all our data into one giant model or theory. Instead, it may involve 
understanding how collections of incompatible models can each contribute to the same coherent 
understanding of a complex mechanism by drawing inferences across their shared implicit metaphysical 
commitments. By identifying these shared commitments, we can find points of contact between the 
                                                             
2 Of course, not all obstacles to integration can be easily addressed by keeping track of our metaphysical 
commitments, or using them to find points of contact between models. In some cases, the metaphysical 
commitments underlying the different models may themselves be in conflict. In such cases, the dispute is not 
about how to integrate the information generated from different models or methodologies, but about the 
underlying metaphysical commitments of the scientists who construct and apply those models. For instance, in the 
case of Spaun, disputes have arisen regarding exactly which sorts of underlying physiological details are truly 
essential for the metaphysical production of large-scale dynamics or cognitive behaviours and whether the 
construction and application of Spaun is implicitly or explicitly committed to the appropriate details (Eliasmith & 
Trujillo 2014; Miłkowski 2016b). Such metaphysical disputes provide a genuine challenge to integration that goes 
beyond merely finding points of contact between different idealized models. Other obstacles to integration are 
more methodological in nature.  Jacqueline Sullivan, for example, argues that distinct experimental protocols used 
by different neuroscientific labs have called into question whether the findings of one lab can be effectively 
applied to the findings of another (Sullivan 2009).  This too is not something the account provided here can easily 
solve.  This account is sadly not a cure-all for the problems facing unification or integration in the scientific study of 
psychological mechanisms. It does, however, provide a guide for how some seemingly incompatible models and 
theories might find points of agreement in order for us to begin to build connections between them. As such, it 
brings us a step closer to understanding how various kinds of seemingly contradictory models can contribute to 
same underlying mechanistic explanation, even if it can’t provide a solution to all problems that such a project 
faces. 
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different models which act as bridges by which we can use data gathered from one model to inform 
others.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The discovery and study of the mechanisms responsible for psychological phenomena is an 
interdisciplinary process, requiring the resources and methodologies of many different domains. What I 
have argued in this paper is that one important such domain is philosophy. The study of mechanisms 
requires engaging in responsible metaphysics: understanding when to make metaphysical claims, how 
such claims are intertwined with our empirical and experimental practices, and when such claims need 
to be revised. Others have argued for the importance of philosophy to cognitive science for different 
reasons (Thagard, 2009), however less attention has been given to the metaphysical commitments 
required to empirically study cognitive mechanisms.  
 Being aware of what our metaphysical commitments are, and how they are employed, is 
extremely important to how we build models, run experiments, and test hypotheses about mechanisms 
in psychology.  We must be cautious of what metaphysical commitments we adopt and why, and careful 
about the sorts of inferences we draw from those commitments. Carelessness can result in 
complications and additional problems for the scientific study of mental mechanisms, but conversely 
getting clear on the metaphysical commitments underlying different scientific models can help us get 
one step closer to understanding how the plurality of models and theories needed to study 
psychological mechanisms can relate to one another. 
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